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ABSTRACT 
In 1992, the National Institute For Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) initiated a study, funded by the National Cancer 
Institute (NCI), to evaluate the health effects, if any, involving underground miners exposure to diesel exhaust. An industry 
organization, the Methane Awareness Research Group (MARG) already in place to respond to gassy mine related issues, was 
redirected to work with diesel concerns. In 1995, NIOSH released a draft protocol and feasibility assessment, indicating its 
intent to initiate s study at 14 underground mines, some of which were operated by MARG members. After considerable de-
bate on the study protocol, in-mine industrial hygiene studies were begun in December, 1997 and expected to end in early 
1999. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The study is a collaborative venture between NIOSH and 
NCI, with NCI providing funding. The purpose is to deter-
mine if there is an association between lung cancer and die-
sel exhaust and if mortality from any cause other than lung 
cancer is elevated. In addition, a retrospective, cohort mor-
tality study, a nested case~ontrol study and a study of bio-
markers is also proposed, regardless of the results of the 
initial diesel study (Cole, et al., 1995). 
The study will involve approximately 8200 employees of 
10 non-metal mines where diesel exposures have been 
common and other confounding effects such as coal dust, 
radon and silica have been low. 
The MARG group was formed in 1994 to address com-
mon gassy mine issues-primarily related to underground 
salt, potash and trona. Initial interests were proposed 
changes to gassy mine regulations (30 CFR, Part 57, Sub-
part T), last open break and bleeder entry definitions. When 
the NIOSH/NCI diesel study began in 1995, the existing 
organization involved many of the mines included in the 
study. MARG efforts were redirected to address this issue. 
MARG was initially involved in commenting on the 
1995 NIOSH/NCI diesel study protocol. This was a group 
effort, combining MARG technical staff, legal counsel and 
nationally recognized experts in the area of industrial hy-
giene, diesel emissions and academia. MARG members and 
experts took part in public hearings and submitted detailed 
comments regarding what MARG felt were serious defi-
ciencies in the protocol. 
Participating with NIOSH in commenting on the study 
protocol did not yield results that the group felt were condu-
cive to defining the effect of diesel exhaust on underground 
miners, our employees. In fact, MARG's recommendations, 
many of which pointed out serious deficiencies in the study 
protocol, were ignored by NIOSH. Due to this lack of coop-
eration, MARG felt it must resort to other avenues to assure 
a good protocol and study. Tlris has resulted in litigation 
against NIOSH that is still in progress and will be discussed 
in detail later. 
DIESEL STUDY!TIMELINE (Atfield, 1996) 
The study was projected to take seven years, but since the 
following schedule was drawn up, protocol revision and 
related activities in Year 1 have taken two years to com-
plete, resulting in an eight year schedule. 
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Year 1 (and 2) 
Complete NCI!DCE Board of Scientific Counselors Re-
view; 
Complete protocol development; 
Complete NIOSH internal review; 
Complete NCI Technical Evaluation of Protocol Review; 
Complete NIOSH Peer review; 
Meet with scientific advisory panel and all interested par-
ties; 
Initiate OMB and IRB clearances. 
Year3 
Begin microfilming records at off-site location and mines; 
Begin coding and entering data; 
Initiate Industrial hygiene (lli) surveys at mine sites; 
Begin mortality follow-up; 
Identify participating mines and miners for the biomarker 
study. 
Year4 
Complete microfilming at mines and off-site locations; 
Begin acquiring death certificates, and coding and key-
punching; 
Complete lli surveys; 
Complete coding and entering of personal and lli data; 
Collect biologic samples and corresponding lli samples. 
Year 5 
Complete mortality follow-up; 
Continue to acquire death certificates, coding, 
Identify next of kin of cases; 
Select controls; 
Complete biologic sample analyses and data analysis, and 
notify workers of biologic sampling results; 
Complete analysis of IH data. 
Year6 
Complete acquisition of death certificates, coding, and key-
punching; 
Complete telephone interviews for case-control study; 
Estimate worker exposure; 
Prepare master computer files for analysis; 
Review biomarker findings, interpret results, and prepare 
reports for publication; 
Meet with advisory panel and other interested parties re-
garding biomarker study findings. 
Year7 
Conduct cohort data analyses; 
Conduct case-control data analyses. 
Year8 
Review epidemiologic findings and interpretation of results; 
Meet with advisory panel and other interested parties re-
garding epidemiologic findings; 
Prepare and submit papers for publication; 
Complete worker notification 
INITIAL 1995 STUDY PROTOCOL 
The initial 1995 protocol was reviewed for MARG and 
submitted to NIOSH by a group of medical and industrial 
hy-giene experts (Cole, et al., 1995). A note about industry 
con-sultants: Standard beliefs, promoted by media and other 
special interest groups, are that any and all industry retained 
consultants are paid to corroborate industry viewpoints. 
MARG realized that our purpose was only as credible as the 
people speaking for ~ which led MARG to retain the best 
experts. 
The debatable corollary to this is that all Government 
entities have only the public interest at heart It is difficult 
for industry to overcome this inherent government advan-
tage in public or in court. Recent experience is that it is not 
deserved or earned. 
MARG experts submitted the following and additional 
comments, of the 1995 Protocol to NIOSH's peer review 
committee: "The proposed NCI-NIOSH study offers op-
portunities to provide further information about the relation 
between exposure to diesel exhaust and risk of lung cancer. 
The study's strengths derive from the moderately large size 
of the cohort and resultant expectation of over 100 lung 
cancers, the wide range of diesel exposures, and the reported 
low levels of exposures to radon and other known occupa-
tional causes of lung cancers. However, there are a number 
of serious limit -at ions that may hinder the evaluation of the 
role of diesel e:\.'J)Osure in cancer risk As is often the situa-
tion in any single epidemiologic study, even though the in-
vestigation may pro-vide information to help clarify the 
health effects of diesel exposure, the inherent limitations 
may preclude a definitive assessment of an association at the 
study's end." 
Additional comments questioned previous diesel studies 
that have shown mixed to slightly positive results in the area 
of lung cancer. Nauss (1998) states "The epidemiologic 
data are consistent in showing weak associations between 
exposure to diesel exhaust and lung cancer." Because of 
this fme line, it is imperative that the NIOSH/NCI study use 
the most meticulous, defensible techniques available to de-
fme the results with the utmost confidence; most impor-
tantly, because of the potential far-reaching effects on the 
operation of the MARG mines and ultimately - the entire 
mining industry. 
A major concern is NIOSH' s method to allow fot past 
occupational exposures. Due to the mobility of mining em-
ployees, (confirmed by NIOSH later during on-site indus-
trial surveys) many miners work at different types of mines 
in their careers and have encountered multiple exposures to 
diesel exhaust, silica, radon, and possibly asbestos that will 
be impossible to quantify. This is a variable that is depend-
ant on prior job history records which are often incomplete 
and the individuals modeling this history will need to use 
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subjective judgement. This will introduce a high degree of 
variability. 
NIOSH also expects to recreate a history of all past die-
sel exposures for the working life of the employee, cumula-
tive as well as time specific. Some of the included MARG 
comments are: "there is the potential for substantial impre-
cision in the estimates of amount of diesel exposure", "The 
estimates for each employee depend upon a series of as-
sumptions (e.g. , that all employees with job x in year y ex-
perienced z amount of diesel exposure) that are not possible 
to confirm and can, at best, be only approximately true.", "it 
must be recognized that actual area and personal exposure 
measurements are missing for the large majority of years the 
mines were in operation, that current levels may correlate 
imperfectly with historical levels, and that area estimates 
may correlate imperfectly with historical levels.", "The 
compounding of potential errors in each of these steps may 
result in considerable error in the estimate of total diesel 
exposure for and individual worker. This aspect of the reli-
ability of the exposure assessment is not addressed in the 
proposaf' (Cole, eta!. , 1995) (emphasis added). 
Also, from the Health Effects Institute (Nauss, 1998), "Die-
sel engine emissions have changed dramatically over the 
last 30 years because of improvements in engine teclmol-
ogy, emissions controls, and fuel formulation." "As a result, 
characterizations of modem-day diesel exhaust cannot be 
used to estimate past exposures, nor can they be used to 
reliably to project future emission profiles." 
Some other comments from Cole, eta/. ; 
"The potential for information bias, especially for question-
naire items such as medical history, asbestos e~"})osure, and 
several other factors, needs to be addressed." 
"The biomarker study appears to be a study in pursuit of 
an explanation for a problem that is not known to exist. The 
rationale for this study is weak, in fact, largely irrelevant. 
Tllis study should be eliminated." 
"The rationale for the use of elemental carbon as the 
primary surrogate of diesel exhaust particulate is Reference 
96 (Draft Protocol), an unpublished Coordinating Research 
Council Report by D.P. Fowler dated 1985. Thus, the ma-
jor reliance for this study on this unpublished, non-peer re-
viewed document appears to this reviewer to need additional 
justification by the investigators." 
"However, it is far more complex to extrapolate today's 
results from earlier times because diesel engines and fuels 
are very different today from even five years ago. How will 
these technological improvements in engines/fuels be incor-
porated into modeling of emissions?" 
"Decades of industrial hygiene experience indicate that 
personal samples rather than area samples provide more 
reliable measures of worker exposure .... Area sampling 
should not receive primary emphasis." 
"The number of samples planned for collection is inade-
quate considering the changing environment in a mine." 
"The HEZ''(Homogeneous Exposure Zone)"/job diction-
ary in this case is an act of faith, not science and, results can 
be totally misleading." 
"It is assumed that with one baseline estimate the com-
plete historical exposure can be constructed for each indi-
vidual. This is not a defensible approach." 
MARG members provided input to the proposed protocol 
and had raised many serious questions that needed to be 
addressed. All of the comments had direct bearing on the 
reliability of the results of the study. As shown, there were 
not just a few minor comments, but many major differences 
of opinion that could effect the study. In the final 1996 
Protocol, essentially all ofMARG's constructive criticisms 
were ignored. Without basing the study on good science, 
defendable conclusions cannot be obtained. 
MARG DIESEL STUDY EFFORTS 
Peer Review Committee 
The NIOSH peer review advisory panel approved the final 
protocol in the fall of 1996 without the support of MARG 
and the affected study mines. 
Lawsuit 
With the prospect of NIOSH arriving at the study mines to 
begin sampling, and the belief the 1996 protocol as written 
would not result in a good study to adequately determine 
diesel effects, MARG took NIOSH to court. The lawsuit 
was filed based on the following issues: 
NIOSHhas: 
( 1) eliminated participation on the peer review advisory 
committee by the affected industry and labor groups; 
(2) the peer review panel violated the Federal Advisory 
Committee (F ACA) Act~ 
(3) ignored the comments of world renowned scientists 
seeking to improve the study; and 
(4} proposed a high risk notification program at the study's 
conclusion for past and current employees, of alleged 
increased risks (anything above 1.0) based on policies 
and procedures that were rejected by Congress when it 
defeated the High Risk Notification bill because they 
would result in wlfounded public concerns and baseless 
litigation claims. 
In short, rather than cure these problems and conduct this 
important study cooperatively, NIOSH continues to insist on 
flawed procedures and policies that shut out stakeholders. 
This creates a probability of invalid scientific results, wastes 
millions of taxpayer dollars, unduly burdens industry and 
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could result in public paranoia of diesel engines, without 
sound evidence of a health risk. 
On October 18, 1996 MARG filed a lawsuit to block the 
use of the September 23, 1996 NIOSH protocol as site visits 
were planned to AKZO or Morton salt facilities in early 
December. The use of the F ACA defense alleged that the 
peer review group was in fact a federal advisory committee 
convened to develop government policy and was not legally 
chartered. Some F ACA requirements are that a committee 
must be fairly balanced in terms of membership of the 
groups affected by the committee. Concerned labor union 
and mining company officials were not allowed significant 
input or balanced representation with the NIOSH personnel 
on the committee. 
The judge granted a preliminary injunction November 
11, 1996 to prevent the peer review panel from meeting to 
adopt the 1996 version of the study protocol. The judge held 
that the committee was subject to FACA and could not pro-
ceed until properly chartered. The judge issued an order 
verifying the preliminary injunction on January 7, 1997. 
Involvement of the NIOSH Board of Scientific Counselors 
NIOSH countered by reverting to the flawed original 1995 
pre-comment protocol and had the NIOSH Board of Scien-
tific Counselors (BSC) review the protocol at their January 
14, 1997 meeting. Even though the 1995 protocol was ac-
know-ledged as flawed by NIOSH and further revised to the 
1996 version, the BSC endorsed the old 1995 protocol with 
no substantive comments. Tills validates MARG's conten-
tion that the purpose of the BSC was to rubber stamp 
NIOSH's program. It seemed NIOSH was more interested 
in keeping to its schedule and priorities than good research. 
MARG requested an expedited hearing for the court to 
enjoin the BSC from meeting January 14, 1997 to consider 
the protocol, which was denied. At the request of the Court, 
negotiations continued with NIOSH attorneys and staff 
during February to attempt to settle study concerns. When 
no substantive concessions were made, MARG filed an ap-
peal to the court's ruling that the BSC met the requirements 
ofF ACA and could review the protocol. 
. It is important to note, government agencies that estab-
lish advisory committees are required by F ACA law to meet 
certain requirements as to filing requirements, charters and 
statements of purpose, balance of membership, conflict of 
interest, etc. Tins is to assure responsible management of 
government funds and that the committees produce results 
that are in accordance to their expertise, and balanced in 
viewpoint. 
Because of information discovered regarding the BSC 
advisory committee, lawsuit was e~rpanded to the include 
the following: 
TI1e BSC was not lawfully established at that time be-
cause NIOSH failed to file any charter with the House 
Committee on Education and the Workforce, which over-
sees NIOSH. When it met on January 14, 1997, the charter 
had not been renewed for over four years, expiring February 
3, 1993. According to FACA and GSA rules, the committee 
is not allowed to meet or act (emphasis added) until the 
charter has been filed. Ironically, to provide a resemblance 
of credibility to the protocol, NIOSH did an "end-run" 
around the court order banning the use of the 1996 protocol. 
NIOSH transferred the protocol which had been generated 
by a non-F ACA approved committee to the presently un-
charterd, expired F ACA BSC. The peer review committee 
had no "license plate on the car", the BSC committee had an 
"expired license plate"- can't drive either one -legallyf 
Also, the BSC had never before been called upon to peer 
review a scientific proposal and this function was not in-
cluded in its charter, therefore, that function is out of its 
jurisdiction and it therefore could not legally review the 
NIOSH protocol. 
F ACA requires membership to be fairly balanced and 
contain a cross-section of those affected. There were no 
members on the protocol committee from the mining com-
munity, mining labor groups or those experienced in diesel 
exhaust carcinogenicity research. NIOSH did not have a 
required management plan for the BSC to assure a balanced 
membersllip. This does not providing the highest level of 
peer review of the protocol, as required by Congress (Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 1996). 
NIOSH appointed BSC members who violated Health 
and Human Services (HHS) Advisory Committee Standards 
(intended to provide balance and neutrality of Committees) 
due to: (a) members' overwhelming reliance on $4 million 
of HHS grants~ (b) prior HHS employment or HHS fellow 
awards~ (c) joint research activities with HHS personnel and 
each other; and (d) the conduct of negotiations for federal 
employment (with agencies directly affected by the diesel 
study) at the same time they reviewed the study as a BSC 
nominee and member (Leathers, 1997). 
On April 28, 1997 the court ruled against MARG and 
refused to enjoin the BSC from meeting and reviewing the 
protocol. MARG submitted a motion for reconsideration. 
The lawsuit was continued in the U. S. Court of Appeals 
in December, 1998. The judge had ruled that by transferring 
the protocol to a F ACA committee, NIOSH had adhered to 
the letter of the law. MARG contended that the protocol was 
flawed due to the above reasons and should be thrown out. 
Two of the three judges hearing the appeal seemed inter-
ested in having a more strict compliance with the express 
terms of F ACA (MARG, 1998). MARG expects a ruling 
early in 1999. 
MARG VISION OF THE DIESEL STUDY 
MARG developed a policy (MARG, 1997) toward the study 
that was presented to NIOSH, NCI and Congressional staff. 
MARG believes that only by instituting these changes, 
would a definitive study arise that would truly answer the 
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question which all parties are searching for - does diesel 
exhaust cause an increased risk of lung cancer in miners? 
Funding for the proposed seven-year study to determine 
whether or not diesel exhaust causes lung cancer by the Na-
tional Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
and the National Cancer Institute (NCI) is contingent upon: 
(1) approval of the protocol by NCI's (Note: not the previ-
ous NIOSH BSC) Board of Scientific Counselors; 
(2) peer review of the protocol pursuant to NCI procedures 
used for extramural study grants and ongoing review of 
the study progress, data, analysis of data and draft re-
ports by a qualified group of scientific, mining and die-
sel experts, pursuant to the Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Act (F ACA) and that is composed of three members 
nominated by labor, three members nominated by in-
dustry and three members nominated by the above; 
(3) study implementation, in phases, beginning with an 
initial three year phase to determine: (a) if a statistically 
significant increased risk of lung cancer is caused by 
diesel exhaust exposure conducted by the NIOSH Re-
search Division in Pittsburgh, P A and the NIOSH Re-
search Division in Spokane, W A (utilizing former Bu-
reau of Mines personnel), (b) the validity and variabil-
ity of proposed diesel sampling devices and analytical 
procedures, and (c) the feasibility of assessing diesel 
exposures over the past 20 years; 
(4) data and analysis sharing (without personal identifiers) 
with interested parties, as it is collected and prepared to 
permit early independent review; and 
( 5) review by the same Advisory Committee of any pro-
posed publications and risk notification to individuals 
or the media, to assure findings based on scientific, 
biological plausibility and validity based on statistically 
significant findings. 
Comments on the June 1997 Protocol 
After the April, 1997 meeting of the NIOSH Board of Sci-
entific Counselors, which the diesel study was approved by 
an organization without any mining or diesel epidemiologi-
cal expertise, the MARG scientists made the following ob-
servations (MARG, 1997): 
"With respect to the Exposure Assessment, NIOSHINCI 
responses in the protocol are cosmetic." 
"It is clear to me that certain members of the Board of 
Scientific Counselors have permitted their loyalty to the 
agency to cloud their scientific judgement when their com-
ments on the proposed study refer to the exposure assess-
ment as "state of the art". The exposure assessment is 
predicated on an enormous hypothetical retrospective expo-
sure framework based on current measurements and a lim-
ited point-in-time (in the 1970's) anchor to the past thirty 
years." 
"With the procedures described, attainment of reliable 
individual miner exposure assignments or even group as-
signments is not possible. Any further effort to use such 
assignments in a dose-response relationship will be based on 
enormous personal judgement, and not a defensible result of 
scientific research." 
"I regret being placed in the roll of being so critical of an 
obviously well-meaning effort, but we strengthen our agen-
cies and improve our understandings of occupational disease 
by supporting the best research we can mount in a period of 
scarce resources. This is not the best research one can 
mount today to address the potentiol health impacts of 
chronic exposure to diesel exhaust." (Emphasis added). 
At the July 23, 1997 BSC meeting, while several mem-
bers of the committee expressed support for MARG's posi-
tion, and concern that NIOSH had not addressed valid is-
sues, the BSC Chainnan pushed for and obtained a unani-
mous vote approving the protocol "with the concerns 
noted". At this time the court had not yet ruled on MARG 's 
motion for recon-sideration. 
The new protocol did not change the basic design of the 
original. Additional comments on the cohort study; case-
control study and exposure assessment was raised, to no 
avail. Further serious questions were brought up on the use 
of elemental carbon and its lack of correlation to airborne 
particulate in relation to some recent Australian and German 
surveys. 
INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE IN-MINE SURVEYS 
Given that the protocol had been approved and was going to 
be used by NIOSH regardless, MARG members began pre-
paring for the upcoming on-site visits. Planning con-
centrated on detennining the level that MARG would repli-
cate NIOSH's data collection for validity testing, access 
rights to employee data files, logistics of taking care of the 
NIOSH employees facility and transportation needs. Bids 
were ac-quired for an outside consultant to take in-mine 
parallel samples for MARG and make arrangements for 
these indi-viduals to receive MSHA training 
There was some initial difficulty in obtaining informa-
tion from NIOSH regarding the type of equipment to be 
used and procedures utilized in the study. Some of the sam-
pling equipment was unproven and prototypical in nature 
and would be difficult to obtain. Continued correspondence 
with NIOSH centered on previous issues that were unre-
solved and contra-dicted with MARG's proposed study 
goals noted above. 
The first NIOSH mine visit was in December, 1997 at 
the IMC Carlsbad (potash) and Mississippi Potash operation 
for the purpose of familiarization and requests for docu-
ments. As always, the first study site had a few problems, 
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with both parties learning the routine and having certain 
equipment problems. NlOSH had some problems with the 
NOx Palmes tubes/dosimeters and sampling pump failures. 
A surprising develpment was the NIOSH request for IMC to 
rate job exposures from 1 to 5 based on their subjective 
judgement! 
The second visit was to Mississippi Potash, New· Mexico 
- February, 1998. MARG decided to change sampling to 
include variable measurements over time and space instead 
of duplicating NIOSH samples. Samples would also be 
taken during other times of the year to allow for environ-
mental variability, such as seasonal temperature and humid-
ity effects. The company also required a search warrant to 
access em-ployee records to prevent the mine operator from 
being sued for allowing NIOSH access to individual per-
sonnel files. 
NIOSH scheduled a public meeting April 17, 1998 to 
bring interested parties up to date on the diesel study, but 
cancelled. A potential meeting has been discussed for the 
spring of 1999. NIOSH has stated in its early peer review 
committee that it was necessary to have regular public 
meetings for labor and company officials to be informed on 
the survey progress. This was evidently just meant for pub-
lic consumption, as it has not happened. 
Morton/Fairport, Ohio (salt) - May 1998 
Mississippi Lime, Illinois, Limestone- June, 1998 - Some 
Employees refused to wear samplers due to safety. reasons. 
The company had employees sign a form so NlOSH would 
also give study results to them. Mississippi Lime was asked 
to participate in the biomarker study. Some areas of the 
mine were declared off-limits for trade secret purposes. 
NIOSH complied with company requests except for distrib-
uting controversial stickers depicting diesel smoke and silica 
until asked again to stop. The company will send all em-
ployees a letter notifying them of sampling results and ask-
ing permission to review their NIOSH provided results so 
they can be compared to the MARG acquired data. 
CargilL Avery Island, Louisiana, (Salt), July, 1998- The 
company had a problem with employee records and may not 
f)e usable for the study. NIOSH offered to come back in 
winter to examine mine humidity effects. Cargill will also 
do this independently. Cargill rubber-stamped NIOSH em-
ployee personal sample data cards so employees could sign 
to give data to Cargill also. 
General Chemical, Wyoming, (trona)- September, 1998 
- General Chemical was able to utilize experience from 
previous mines to acquire employee data from NIOSH. All 
parties are becoming experienced and the study ran rela-
tively smoothly. 
FMC, Wyoming, (trona)- Scheduled first quarter, 1999 
OCI, Wyoming, (trona)- Scheduled first quarter, 1999 
DIESEL STUDY RESULTS 
Results at this time are very preliminary. NIOSH is in proc-
ess of entering worker records and some of the initial mine 
data js being analyzed. According to NIOSH, draft data 
analysis showed excellent correlation between diesel surro-
gates respirable elemental carbon (EC), CO, NO and NCh. 
This gives NIOSH confidence that generation of past expo-
sure to diesel particulate levels can be modeled. 
Preliminary analysis of MARG data for the first two 
mines shows quite a different result - that of poor correla-
tion with diesel surrogates. This brings a question to the 
above NIOSH conclusion and for the overall study results. 
From the beginning, MARG scientists have disagreed with 
NIOSH's initial choice of surrogate. If the sampled diesel 
emission gasses cannot be correlated to diesel particulate 
exposures, then confidence in historical exposure level 
modeling is minimal. 
This is the reason MARG is interested in sharing data, so 
discrepancies such as this can be examined independently to 
promote better research and conclusions. Hopefully, the 
entire body of data from the in mine testing will provide 
sufficient answers to these questions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
MARG has been disappointed with the uncooperative nature 
of NIOSH and NCI in attempting to establish an effective, 
comprehensive protocol to study diesel exhaust in under-
ground mines. An analysis of existing scientific studies 
shows a slightly positive correlation with cancer, but not to 
the degree voiced by NIOSH. Because of this slender mar-
gin, it is essential to perform the highest level of testing to 
ascertain if there is such a correlation. MARG has sincerely 
raised many important questions and offered alternatives to 
move toward this goal with little acknowledgement or coop-
eration from NIOSH or NCI. 
MARG believes that due to the inherent shortcomings of 
the study protocol, primarily in utilizing poor science and 
methodology, it will be impossible to determine with any 
scientific confidence, that there is any relationship between 
diesel exhaust and cancer in underground miners. It is a 
shame to waste time and money on a tremendously impor-
tant study when the outcome will be very much in doubt. 
MSHA has gone ahead and promulgated diesel emissions 
regulations for both Coal and Metal Non-Metal mines in 
1998. 
This was despite the fact that NIOSH is the research ann of 
MSHA under Section 50 1(b) of The Act (MSM 1977) and 
NIOSH has promoted the necessity for this study as justifi-
cation for MSHA regulations (Silvennan, 1994 ). MSHA 
has determined it is not necessary to wait for the results of 
the NIOSH diesel study to promulgate regulations (fomb, 
1998~ Federal Register, 1998). 
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A recent piece of legislation attached to the 1999 on-
mibus spending bill (Public Law 105-277) directs the White 
House Office of Management and Budget to require that 
agencies make underlying data from federally funded re-
search available through the Freedom of Information Act It 
has been MARG's contention all along that data sharing is 
essential to have confirmation by independent sources of 
federal research conclusions. Peer review is the accepted 
method of confirm-ing research results in the scientific 
community. Any reasonable individual would have to ask 
why NIOSH has resisted sharing data from the start of the 
Protocol development. MARG believes it is essential that 
the data be analyzed concurrently so both parties can pub-
lish conclusions together. 
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